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Reservations.
Recently there has grown up an industry-drawn not just from the
estate planning bar, but also from the broader financial press-all intent
upon raising the hue and the cry with respect to online, do-it-yourself
wills. This cautionary chorus has undertaken to chronicle the disasters
that have resulted where laypersons attempt to assemble a will using
one of the inexpensive programs that have appeared on the legal
landscape over the last ten or fifteen years. The message is clear: when
it comes to estate planning, the law is not congenial to lay-endeavors.
But over much the same period of time, poverty lawyers and their
kindred spirits in the academic bar have focused attention on the
paucity of legal representation in civil law matters available to people
of modest or moderate means-in the area of estate planning as well as
otherwise. To ameliorate problems of access to justice, some have
proposed expanding the opportunities for pro se representation so that
the underrepresented can represent themselves. In light of this
movement to expand pro se representation in civil law matters, the
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possibility of making a will online without assistance (and cost) of
counsel can only be taken as a positive development and any resistance
embedded in the law viewed with a degree of skepticism and
puzzlement that argues for legal change.' But furthermore, the
normative imperative that would render the law more hospitable to the
online, do-it-yourself will does not merely emanate from the access-tojustice movement. The law of wills itself harbors values with respect to
testamentary freedom that mandate some sort of accommodation with
an innovation that could empower significant numbers of people when
it comes to directing the disposition of their property at death.
Any effort to improve the standing of these lay-created wills in the
legal firmament must ultimately come to terms with the various ways in
which these documents commonly run afoul of the law of wills-a
notoriously technical and unforgiving area of the law. Two types of
errors stand out as fundamental mistakes in the execution of the
document and, where the language of the instrument is concerned,
drafting errors, including the misuse of legal terms. This Article will
later address the rigors of due execution, but suffice it for now to
accept that they are gradually ameliorating in ways that can only
facilitate the use of the online produced instrument. The language by
which the testator would effectuate the disposition of assets is quite
another matter, however. Where terms of art are used, intentionally or
otherwise, canons of construction are still quite rigid so that, in the
ordinary course, testamentary language can still be read consistently
with stipulative meanings, whatever the now-deceased testator might
*
Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. I want to
express my appreciation to my colleagues at the University of Tennessee College of
Law, especially Ben Barton, Amy Hess, Val Vojdik and David Wolitz, all of whom
generously read the Article or consulted with respect to it at various stages of its
formation. Angela Carmella of Seton Hall School of Law and Jennifer Hendricks of
Colorado Law also read and commented as I was writing. In addition, I offer a special
thanks to JoAnn Engelhardt, my former colleague at Bessemer Trust, who first pointed
out this topic to me, underscoring its timely nature. Finally, I acknowledge with deep
gratitude the contribution made by the late Marc Poirier of Seton Hall School of Law to
all my work. With this piece as with so many of my articles, Marc read several
versions and, as usual, kindly, gently encouraged me as I gathered my diverse insights
into the linear exposition of an idea. It is to his memory that I dedicate this Article.
1.
These online products have proliferated and this growth has particular
implications in the estate planning area. For example, LegalZoom alone claims to have
served over one million customers in creating various types of estate planning
documents. LegalZoom Celebrates 10 Years, Last Will and Testament, LEGALZOOM,
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/legalzoom-celebrates-10-years
[https://perma.cc/PBQ5-KHDH] (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). Aside from the seeming
convenience of the format, fees for a will generated online by the testator can be as
little as $69, pennies on the dollar compared to the typical costs of a will produced by
an
attorney
in
a
conventional
law
office
setting.
LEGALZOOM,
http://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/last-will-and-testamentoverview.html [https://perma.cc/BTA2-SJEE] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
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have actually meant. And where a term of art is missing, supplanted by
a more casual phrase, courts have been known to deem the casual
language inherently ambiguous and, accordingly, set it aside as
ineffectual.2
Interestingly, however, there is buried in the law of wills an
exception where the rigorous treatment of legal language is concerned.
The law has long been known to treat wills produced without aid of
legal counsel with a degree of interpretive generosity not shown to
those prepared by an attorney. When a will is drafted by a layperson,
courts have, at times, taken the liberty of looking beyond problematic
language to attempt to construct the testator's meaning with greater
nuance, often looking to the language of the larger will to shed light on
meanings that are apparently idiosyncratic.
To date, however, no one has considered the appropriateness of
extending this interpretive generosity to those wills created via online
will-drafting programs. This may be because the online programs
would seemingly disqualify their documents at the outset: while the
online-created instrument is generated by a layperson interacting with a
computer program, the platform claims to produce instruments with the
integrity of professionally prepared work. In truth, however, these are
lay-created documents and the websites are explicit that assistance of
counsel is not part of the package. But further, consistent with the claim
that the documents are on par with professionally prepared work,
online-produced wills are printed and, under current law, must be
attested (witnessed) to be validated. The attested will is the
paradigmatic instrument produced by estate planning counsel. In
contrast, the will that typically benefits from the exception is a
holographic instrument, valid by virtue of being handwritten, and, most
importantly, nearly always a lay-created instrument. But in this
instance, the fact that the online-produced document is meant to be an
attested will should be neither here nor there. The resultant document is
still lay-created. The online-produced will has been created without
assistance of counsel, which is the essential attribute supplying the
fundamental rationale for applying the exception.
A normative bias in the law of wills would also support this legal
posture of interpretive generosity, this largess, where the onlineproduced will is concerned. There is no denying that lay-drafted wills
tend to be rife with testator's idiosyncratic language, legal terms
misapplied, and even beneficiaries misidentified. The lay-drafted will,
even one drafted online via a computer-assisted program, contrasts
See, e.g., Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 355-56 (Cal. 1968) (where a
2.
playfully worded disposition to Chester H. Quinn and Roxy Russell is treated as void
with respect to half going to Roxy Russell when extrinsic evidence reveals Roxy
Russell to be a dog).
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readily with the attorney-drafted, attested will, where unique property
and bespoke plans are detailed in language the meaning of which is
unmistakable to the initiated. Nonetheless, the fundamental guiding
premise of testamentary freedom is that testators have a right to control
what happens to their property at death. Viewed in light of the
contemporary push to guarantee access to civil law powers and
institutions, the online-produced instrument must be seen as the latest
iteration of that aspect of the common law property right-dating from
the end of the medieval era-that makes the freedom to transfer
property (including transfer at death) integral to the right. This common
law understanding is embedded in the enduring holographic will and
operates as a normative force with respect to any regime that would
resist the products of online self-help.
At the same time, however, the normative principal that would
secure the right to make a will also vindicates the will well-made-that
is, the attorney-drafted, bespoke will that, using lucid, albeit technical
language, the meaning of which is unmistakable to the initiated, allows
the testator to speak far into the future, long after death. The same
vigorous right to transfer property at death that mandates an
interpretive largess where lay-created instruments are concerned, at the
same time necessitates that this generosity, if extended to online-created
instruments, be circumscribed in its application so that interpretive
largess does not jeopardize the discipline that undergirds the wellrendered, attorney-drafted instrument. The law of future interests is the
crown jewel of the common law, and, as such, it represents the fruition
of the right to control the disposition of property at death. Even as steps
are taken to secure the rights of the underrepresented, case law
whereby interpretive generosity is extended to lay-created wills cannot
be allowed to subsume the law of attorney-created wills, thereby
rendering ambiguous the very technical language-the terms of artthat are part and parcel of the law of future interests. The law must
avoid the cumulative impact of ad hoc relief cognized into a body of
case law that renders the language of all wills uncertain. The way to do
this is to continue to limit the application of interpretive generosity to
lay-drafted wills and to bolster this limitation by confining it to wills
passing property not in excess of a certain economic value. Even as
interpretive largess is extended to the online will, it must remain the
exception and not the rule.
Part I of this Article places the online, do-it-yourself will in the
context of the push to enlarge access to justice for people of poor or
moderate means in civil law matters. Part I has three subsections. The
first of these subsections examines the recent movement to expand pro
se representation where sundry civil law rights are concerned. The
second subsection explores the significance of pro se opportunities in
non-litigious circumstances such as estate planning. The third
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subsection considers what might be at stake for the poor and middle
class in the right to dispose of property at death. Part II treats the
online, do-it-yourself will and its tenuous position in the current law of
wills. Part III makes the case that the online, do-it-yourself will is not
so clearly an attested will but is a hybrid, with attributes of a
holographic instrument also. This insight sets the stage for the later
argument that an exception in the law with respect to the rigorous
treatment of legal language-a kind of interpretive generositypreviously extended to the holographic will is appropriately applied to
this newer vehicle created via self-help. Part IV sets out the rigorous
standards for execution that any will-lay-drawn or otherwise-must
surmount. This Part examines both the historic requirements for
execution (many of which are still in play in some states) and recent
reforms, building to the observation that the attested will and the
holographic one, even though each is predicated upon a distinct legal
ethos, are starting to merge. This observation invites use of standards
heretofore applicable to the holographic will (standards like interpretive
generosity) to the attested (or hybrid). Part V leaves behind the rigors
for executing a will and turns to the other legal challenge for the person
who would create a will without assistance of counsel-the canons of
construction for testamentary language. If the rigors of execution have
begun to ameliorate, the standards for interpreting legal language are
still robust. Part VI examines interpretive largess as it has been applied
to holographic wills and suggests that it be extended to the online, doit-yourself will. Part VII acknowledges the potential that an expanded
use of interpretive largess could have on the law of future interests and
suggests ways to cabin it by embedding its application in a rigorous
methodology and then limiting its application.
I. ENLARGING ACCESS

A. Recent Movements
The estate planning universe is generally thought to be the
province of specially-trained legal counsel wielding arcane terminology
on behalf of well-heeled clients who are intent upon the special
privilege of securing their respective dead hands far into the future.
Considered in this context alone, the advent of the computer-assisted,
lay-created will would be momentous, portending the transformation of
this area of the law from an elite universe to one by and for everyone.
If this change were not in and of itself significant, however, the advent
of a more readily available will acquires an even deeper social meaning
when it is considered in light of the larger movement to render sundry
civil law institutions more accessible (and ultimately more relevant) to
the poor and to the those of moderate means. Particularly relevant to
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the do-it-yourself will is the movement to broaden the scope and
otherwise facilitate pro se representation in civil law matters.3
This movement to make civil law institutions more accessible
began several decades ago when poverty lawyers and their allies in the
academic bar began to draw attention to the paucity of legal
representation for people of modest or moderate means in civil law
matters.' This concern produced a number of proposals by which to
ameliorate the problem of access to justice.5 "Civil Gideon" would
afford the poor and middle class a right to representation at public
expense in civil matters similar to the constitutional guarantee to
counsel in criminal matters recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright. As
the dominant strategy here, however, the need to guarantee civil
plaintiffs a competent lawyer with time to investigate, research, and try
their cases would constitute a considerable challenge. Subsequently,
another, arguably more pragmatic, approach to the problem emerged.
Instead of guaranteeing counsel, this second approach would expand the
opportunities for and improve upon the practicalities surrounding pro se
representation so that the underrepresented can represent themselves.'
Those pressing for pro se reform recognize that, while pro se
representation may be predicated upon a simpler incentive structure,
still, few courts are set up to cope with a substantial pro se docket. The
law and procedures in courts must be simplified if pro se representation
is to become a ready option for those of modest or moderate means.
But to date, little progress has been made with respect to pro se reform.

3.
See infra Part II.
4.
See infra Part I.B.
5.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, infra note 22, at 45-46.
6.
372 U.S. 335 (1963). See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 20-23
(2004); Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (andfor Pro Se Court Reform), 62
FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1227 (2010).
7.
The idea would be-as per the ABA Section of Real Property, Trust and
Estate Law, Preliminary Commentary of ABA Task Force on Do-It Yourself Estate
Planning (2011)-to "provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low
income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs
are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child
custody." Barton, supra note 6, at 1229 (citing Howard H. Dana, Jr.,
Report
to
the
House
of
Delegates,
A.B.A.
1
(2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid indigent-defend
ants/Is sclaidresolution_06all2a.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3TC-U9RB]).
For those advocating pro se reform, the concern is that, with respect to the criminal
justice system, Gideon itself, while a noble idea, has proven a disappointment. Those
attorneys remain so underpaid and overburdened that acquittals and actual trials remain
few. In the words of one critic, Gideon has amounted to little more than "high-minded
rhetoric with a shameful lack of substance." Id. at 1233. By the same token (so the
argument goes), if civil Gideon became a reality, it is unlikely that civil plaintiffs would
be guaranteed a competent lawyer with time to investigate, research, and try their
cases.
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The suggestion is that, where this larger movement to improve access
to civil law institutions is concerned, the fundamental impediment to
reform is the bar itself. The bar has reason to see the law and
procedures remain resistant to litigation pro se. It is not that members
of the bar count on or covet the modest fees attendant upon
representing the poor or even the middle class. What is really at stake
are the fees flowing from the more prosperous clients. The claim is
that, if representation pro se became accessible and effective, wealthier
clients might also avail themselves of it in simpler matters and the lowhanging fruit of legal practice would vanish.
B. Testamentary Privileges
This broader drive to render civil law institutions more accessible
to the poor and near-poor provides a normative frame in which to
consider the online, do-it-yourself will. Yet, neither Civil Gideon nor
the push for pro se reform is much focused on the availability of legal
advice to poor and middle class people in situations that are nonlitigious. Neither tack in pursuit of reform focuses on those situations
where access to legal knowledge is integral to legal planning-that is, to
structuring one's life through the exercise of fundamental autonomy
under the civil law. The need to draw aspects of life within the ambit of
the law of wills is one such situation.'
Where the law of wills is concerned, in realizing a testator's
wishes for the disposition of her estate at death, there are several
distinct occasions when this testator (or her executor) might benefit
from relevant legal knowledge. Only one of these situations-the
probate of a will-is possibly litigious in and of itself. But, in recent
years, probate has been stepped down so that the paradigm case is no
longer presumptively adversarial (Probate in Solemn Form), to become
in the ordinary course an administrative procedure (Probate in Common
Form). And at least some probate courts would appear to be ahead of
the curve here, as now in many states pro se representation is not
uncommon. Lines can be long and clerks can be terse but, when
families come forward to probate a will, forms are available and
essential legal information can be had. Most importantly, no one is
surprised when the layperson comes in seeking assistance with the
mechanical aspects of probate.' If the will is admitted to probate, clerks
8.
See RHODE, supra note 6, at 80, 82, 100; Deborah L. Rhode, The
Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209, 227-29
(1990).
9.
EXECUTORS,

See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ESTATE PROCEDURES FOR
ADMINISTRATORS,

COLLECTORS

BY

AFFIDAVIT,

AND

SUMMARY

ADMINISTRATION 1 (2014); FORMS - Surrogates Court Forms: Probate Forms, N.Y.
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs., http://www.nycourts.gov/forms/surrogates/probate.shtml
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can also assist with the next stage-settling the estate. Given that
settling the estate occurs subject to judicial supervision, it should come
as no surprise that court clerks are again ready with various types of
assistance-forms on which to inventory the estate, information as to
the mechanics of public notice to creditors, or directions as to changing
title to property, etc."
But currently, where legal assistance is least available and remains
most necessary is in taking the first step to subject a person's affairs to
the law of wills-that is, in creating the will itself. The legal universe
has been quite resistant here: a person who wants to dispose of her
estate using a will is hard-pressed not to seek out an attorney with
particular expertise in estate planning, first to draft the will and then to
supervise the process of attestation. Admittedly, in those states that
recognize the holographic will, it represents a second avenue by which
to die testate. But while the holographic will avoids the historically
picayune requirements of attestation, such self-help risks ambiguities in
drafting likely to render probate only. a prelude to a construction
proceeding where, absent some measure of interpretive largess,
meanings ascribed to language within the instrument are likely to be
governed by canons anticipated by few laypersons." Those who hope to
make the law of wills more accessible simply by easing the procedures
surrounding probate should take heed.
C. A Meaningful Right for the Poor
For many people, will-making seems most naturally the province
of the affluent. It is intuitive: wills are made by people who have
wealth in excess of what they need, who can complete their lives with
[https://perma.cc/R832-XNCG] (last updated Oct. 10, 2013); FORMS - Surrogates
Court Forms: Small Estate Forms, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/forns/surrogates/smallestate.shtml [https://perma.cc/86MR7KWV] (last updated Oct. 10, 2013) (the small estates forms are available only for
estates of no more than, depending upon date of death, $20,000 or $30,000 of personal
property).
Note, however, that, in settling an estate, the value of mere legal
10.
information-as distinct from advice-may only take the executor so far. Settling even a
small estate can involve paying taxes (income, if not estate) and distributing property to
beneficiaries pursuant to the will. Court supervision notwithstanding, self-help here
occurs against the backdrop of fiduciary liability so that mistakes can be costly. When
decisions become controversial, the fact that they were made under advice of counsel is
one of the few defenses. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. JACOBS, ESTATE PLANNING SMARTS 59
(2013); Deborah L. Jacobs, The Case Against Do-It-Yourself Wills, FORBES.COM (Sept.
7, 2010, 9:50 AM), www.forbes.com/2010/09/07/do-it-yourself-will-mishaps-personalfinances-estate-lawyers-overcharge.html [https://perma.cc/MG6E-2MJ9].
11.
See, e.g., Zhao v. Wong, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 1996). Aldrich
v. Basile also provides an excellent example of errors in usage of language made in the
course of lay endeavors. 136 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2014). See infra Part VI.
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material resources to spare. Poor people by definition have less than
they need to live, so at death they would plausibly have little to nothing
to pass on. Indeed, even middle class people are not likely over the
course of life to generate much of what might be termed an "operating
surplus." And (so the argument would continue), people of little to no
means have no need to avail themselves of the law of wills. What they
have can descend pursuant to the intestacy statute which is, after all,
drafted so as to reflect the desires of the average testator.
If this is the case, then, while the advent of the computer-assisted,
lay-created will may portend the emergence of a new era of
accessibility for the poor and the near-poor, the question is what
meaningful effect redounds to these people when they are secured in the
right to make a will. While access to many areas of the civil law is
highly consequential for those of little means, the suggestion that poor
people are effectively excluded from an important and empowering
legal domain if they do not have access to the primary vehicle of estate
planning-the will-could appear oxymoronic.
But it is not. There are families with little to no income (and poor
prospects of improving earning ability) who own a modest home or a
small farm fortuitously acquired in an earlier generation. In the face of
income precariousness, this kind of capital asset can provide a modicum
of stability by guaranteeing members a place to live. The family
improves its chances of hanging on to this asset, however, if the
property is carefully husbanded between generations. For example, in
the hands of a disabled family member (who inherits the property
courtesy of the intestacy statute), the property can disqualify the
recipient from aid; indeed, the sale of the property could even be
required in order to maintain eligibility for aid, depriving the family of
a source of stability going forward.12 Further, the property can descend
(again via the intestacy statute) to multiple owners, complicating the
title and substantially increasing the transaction costs of liquidating the
asset if the time was ripe.
In another example, the middle class family that, against the odds,
generates a modest operating surplus can potentially better its
circumstances by carefully husbanding this accumulation over several
generations. Just as the right of bequest is used by the affluent, a will
can be used as a tool of private ordering, to ensure that money flows to
family members whose circumstances do not jeopardize it or, in the
alternative, flows to those who actually need it.
Finally, and more generally, making a will can be an exercise in
aspects of fundamental humanity. Transfers of property at death are the
12.
Use of disclaimers or renunciations to redirect the flow of assets so that
they do not flow to the recipient of Medicare or Medicaid and jeopardize the recipient's
entitlement is not always successful. See Troy v. Hart, 697 A.2d 113 (Md. App. 1997).
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legal and economic expression of mortality. For the family, the shift of
property at that time is not just an economic transition but an emotional
one. Because the will speaks from the grave and represents the personal
choices of the testator, it has about it the aspect of a dying statement, a
swan song, and the transfer of items of property pursuant to it take on
aspects of metaphor, especially where the property transferred is of
largely sentimental value. Transfers pursuant to the intestacy statute
arguably lack this intimacy and resonance. For this reason, the
exclusion of the poor and middle class from the law of wills is a
significant and unjustifiable deprivation.13
II. AN INTERNET SOLUTION?

Estate planning is only one of many fields in the financial services
industry that have seen the emergence of online, do-it-yourself products
in recent decades. These providers would support individuals as they
set about to prepare their own income tax returns, form corporations or
business partnerships, and indeed create their own wills and trusts. 14
These online providers include the widely-advertised LegalZoom as
well as Lawdepot, RocketLawyer, Nolo, Corporate Filing Solutions
Made Easy, and others." However, where the online, do-it-yourself
will is concerned, there has been a veritable call to arms. The
expressed misgivings echo broad and deep. Not only have several
journalists from the financial press made exposing the pitfalls of online,
do-it-yourself wills their special mission,' 6 but also, in 2010, the ABA

13.

See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A

HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012) (a study of how law and money foster
relationships when it comes to inheritance).
14.
Preliminary Commentary of ABA Task Force on Do-It-Yourself Estate
Planning, A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. TR. & EsT. L. 2, 4 (2011).
Id.
15.
16.
ELDERLAWANSWERS, Letting a Computer Plan Your Estate: Is It Worth
the Risk? (May 28, 2013), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/letting-a-computer-planyour-estate-is-it-worth-the-risk-8129 [https://perma.cc/X8BA-ZV3R]; Wendy S. Goffe
&
Rochelle
L.
Haller,
From Zoom
to Doom?
The Risks
of
Planning,
http://files.aliEstate
Do-It-Yourself
cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/EPCMJ1 108_Goffe thumb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CMH-L7SW]; Deborah L. Jacobs, What Could Happen If You Write
2012,
5:57
AM),
Trust?, FORBES
(Aug.
16,
Your
Own Living
http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/08/16/what-could-happen-if-youwrite-your-own-living-trust/#68375578747b [https://perma.cc/5X5P-P4KR]; Deborah L
Jacobs, Google Takes Aim at Lawyers, FORBES (AUG. 17, 2011, 5:43 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2011/08/17/google-backing-of-diy-legalforms-will-force-lawyers-to-lower-fees/#alcbee33f6e9 [https://perma.cc/6NDG-5RY6]
Deborah L. Jacobs, The Case Against Do-It-Yourself Wills, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2010,
9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/09/07/do-it-yourself-will-mishaps-personalNathan
[https://perma.cc/RG4H-435B];
finances-estate-lawyers-overcharge.html
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Section on Real Property Trust and Estate Law convened a task force to
look into the problems attendant upon these new estate planning
programs.17 Chronicled errors include failure to execute the instrument
properly, misuse of terms of art, and (related to the misuse of legal
terms) failure to anticipate the prioritization of beneficiary claims as
imposed by state law and embedded in the program.18
It is interesting to note, however, that, this hue and cry
notwithstanding, there is to date precious little case law with which to
establish that the public is ill-served by the online, do-it-yourself will.
Where the law of wills is concerned, no case law has emanated from a
probate or a construction proceeding that would validate particular
expressed concerns. Indeed, at this point, the most powerful evidence
against these wills is largely anecdotal, so that even the ABA Task
Force takes as its point of departure information gathered informally.19
However, this silence in the case law does not entirely vitiate the
complaints against these new products. Plausible explanations exist for
the absence of litigation. There is the significant possibility that many
of those relying on the online programs are either sufficiently
impecunious or just too cost-conscious to approach the courts where
there is need for post-mortem rehabilitation of online created
instruments. Where a family has little money or is simply unwilling to
spend money on legal proceedings, the will that fails the tests of due
execution is unlikely to generate case law but will simply not be
probated, leaving decedent's property to pass pursuant to the intestacy
statute. And similarly, mistakes in drafting do not surface in
construction proceedings. Parties on either side of an ambiguous
testamentary provision not infrequently settle out of court. But further,
cases may not have materialized because the industry has simply not
matured sufficiently. Problematic instruments may exist, but they will
only surface in years to come when testators have died.
But while there is to date no probate or construction proceeding to
validate the particular concerns expressed by the bar and in the
financial press, there are a few cases where would-be testators, still
living but dissatisfied with online purveyors, seek to recover under a
claim of unauthorized practice. These cases lend some measure of
institutional resonance to the anecdotal evidence gathered by the bar

Koppel, The Dog Ate My Jury Summons, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203633104576621054290446610
[https://perma.cc/7AFP-YPE8]; Steve Leimberg, Can Husband Creat Irrevocable Trust
for
Benefit
of
His
Wife
and
Visa
Versa?,
(Apr.
3,
2008),
https://www.naepc.org/journal/issue05e.pdf [https://perma.cc/7H44-XVGY].
17.
See, e.g., id.
18.
Id. at 16-19.
19.
Id. at 16-18.
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and journalists.20 Even though these cases seek redress for deficiencies
that surface prior to death when the testator can still correct the
instrument, they have a certain salience when they are considered
against the high-stakes backdrop of post-mortem immutability.
This poverty of cases treating online-created wills notwithstanding,
cases from closely allied areas of the law suggest there are other
reasons to anticipate that, when these wills surface, many of them will
be deemed problematic. The online will is susceptible to many of the
same hazards as the venerable do-it-yourself instruments of
longstanding-the holographic will and (related to it) the stationary
form.2 1 Where the creation of a will has been concerned, self-help has
long been an option (with attendant risks). Not only have holographic
wills been possible in many jurisdictions,22 but stationery stores have
sold forms with pre-printed dispositive language (e.g., "I bequeath;" "I
devise") and blank spaces for inserting descriptions of particular
properties and names of beneficiaries.2 3 Therefore, while to date there
may be little case law centering on the online, do-it-yourself will, it is
worth noting that, modernity notwithstanding, there is a continuing
stream of cases centering on these traditional varieties of do-it-yourself
wills, and in particular, the execution pitfalls24 and drafting errors" that
emanate from them. The only conclusion to be drawn from a review of
these cases is that where the law of wills is concerned, self-help
remains fraught.

See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 2:10-4018-CV-C-NKL, 727
20.
F.Supp.2d 782 (W.D. Mo. July 27, 2010); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, No.
CV-12-1043, 2013 Ark. 370 (Ark. Oct. 3, 2013); Webster v. LegalZoom.com, Inc.
No. B240129, 2014 WL 4908639 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014); Litevich v.
LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. XO4HHDCV14055757S, 2015 WL 4570739 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 20, 2015); Lowry v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 4:11CV02259, 2012 WL
2953109 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2012); Bergenstock v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 13
CVS 15686, 2015 WL 3866703 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 23, 2015); LegalZoom.com, Inc.
v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2014 WL 1213242 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 24, 2014); LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. North Carolina State Bar, No. 11 CVS
15111, 2012 WL 3678850 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2012).
Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem-The Case Against
21.
Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REv. 93 (2006).
22.

JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

197-98 (9th ed. 2013).
23.
See, e.g., ENODARE, LEGAL WILL KIT: WILLS MADE EASY 92-95 (2011);
DOUGLAS GODBE, THE WILLS AND TRUSTS KIT: YOUR COMPLETE GUIDE TO PLANNING
FOR THE FUTURE 155-56 (2D. ed. 2006); AARON LARSON, WILLS AND TRUSTS KIT FOR

DUMMIES (2008).

See In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2012).
24.
Stationary forms also create a context in which drafting errors can make
25.
their way into the courts for judicial scrutiny. See Aldrich v. Basile, 136 So. 3d 530
(Fla. 2014).
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Indeed, two recent cases illustrate this point. In both cases, the
decedent avoided legal counsel and opted for a stationary form to
dispose of property at death. In re Estate of Chastain2 6 involved a
question of due execution.27 On the form, at the end of the dispositive
and administrative language, there was no line for the testator's
signature, although lines for witness signatures were included. 28 The
witnesses signed the will, but with no obvious place for the testator to
sign, he proceeded to sign only the attached self-proving affidavit,
where a line designated for the testator's signature was included. 29 The
Tennessee Supreme Court took a hard line and held the will unsigned
and thus invalid.30 According to the court, a testator's signature on the
affidavit alone was insufficient and this was the result even though the
affidavit stipulated that the attached document was intended by the
testator to be his will. 3 1

The second case, Aldrich v. Basile,32 differed from Chastain in
that the will in Aldrich was deemed valid and admitted to probate. 33 The
issue in Aldrich was rather the language of disposition; in particular,
the absence of a residuary clause ("All the rest, residue or remainder of
my estate I devise and bequeath . . .") rendered the will ineffective to
dispose of any property acquired after the date the will was signed and
not specifically devised or bequeathed in the instrument.34 We will
return to Aldrich later in this Article. Suffice at this point to note that
the Florida Supreme Court construed the document in terms of
longstanding and very conservative canons of construction, effectively
refusing to read into the will any unexpressed or inexplicit dispositive
language.35 In the face of a recalcitrant court, the property in question
passed by intestacy.36
Of course, connected to the underlying rationale for these online
platforms are the purveyors' suggestions that this new iteration upon
testamentary self-help avoids many of the pitfalls associated with the
holographic will and the stationary form. This implication is part and
parcel of the claim that, while generated by a layperson interacting with
a computer program, these online programs produce documents that
26.
401 S.W.3d 612 (Tenn. 2012).
27.
Id. at 617.
28.
Id. at 614-15.
29.
Id. at 615-16.
30.
Id. at 622.
Note that recently the law is not entirely unyielding on this point. See In
31.
re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1339-40 (N.J. 1991).
32.
136 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2014).
33.
Id. at 532-33.
Id. at 531.
34.
35.
Aldrich, 136 So. 3d at 537.
36.
Id.
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have the integrity of professionally prepared work.37 By simplifying
language and framing testators' choices, creators of these online
platforms try to bring to the resulting document discipline and an
overall coherence that earlier self-made wills have often lacked.38
Nevertheless, for testators hoping to rely on the online instrument,
the problem of ambiguous or misused language remains, along with
other drafting challenges. Online, the would-be testator assembles the
document section by section, answering successive questions about his
or her estate planning desires-dispositions of tangible personal
property and real estate, gifts to charity, and transfers to children
(outright or in trust). In this process, the platform seeks to avoid the
problems of earlier self-help vehicles by replacing arcane legal terms of
art with layman's language." For example, "residuary legatees"
become "primary beneficiaries." But further, given some sets of
desires, the platform makes a determination as to an optimal
arrangement and the final configuration of the estate then reflects this
determination, whether it accords with the testator's desires or not. In
one instance, the program mechanically placed a bequest to children in
a credit shelter trust.40 Initially the testator had confidence that whatever
the provision entailed, it was consonant with his family's interest and
comported with his desires for them as beneficiaries of his estate, that
is, until he spoke with a lawyer who apprised him of the difference
between receiving property outright and receiving it in trust.41
There are still other challenges when making a will. The law
prioritizes the claims of beneficiaries with respect to the estate, so that
some categories of beneficiaries are satisfied first and others are
satisfied only after other beneficiaries and the debts of the estate are
paid. 42 So, for example, while testators often intend that those
designated "primary beneficiaries" take the bulk of the estate, what
testators often do not know is that transfers to residuary legatees occur
net of decedent's debts and the debts of the estate (including taxes).
Further, even if denoted "primary beneficiaries" within the platform,

37.
Supra note 14.
38.
See LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com [https://perma.cc/PR5GTCQY] (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
39.
Id.
40.
Class Action Complaint for Violation of Ohio Revised Code 4705 and
R.C. 1345 1 17-19, Lowry v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 4:11CV02259, 2012 WL
2953109 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2012).
41.
Id. (a testator discovered that the online platform had concluded from
information he had provided about his family that a credit shelter trust benefiting his
children would be in order and, without presenting him with the pros and cons of such
a provision and allowing him to elect it, the platform mechanically included the trust in
the finished will).
42.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-902 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
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these transfers also occur only after transfers to other beneficiaries.
This prioritization of claims is embedded in the platform where
fundamental choices govern and constrain subsequent choices. This
prioritizing between beneficial transfers is not something many users
are likely to anticipate. To the untutored, each designated transfer can
appear to be a discrete, free-standing element. But the interaction
between the sections-the effect of one decision on others-is pervasive
throughout the will. In short, the resulting document may be coherent
as a matter of law, but the interaction of sections may be such that the
outcome is not what the testator wanted. All of this means that, even
though a "document assistant" may stand at the ready to review for
spelling, grammar, and overall consistency, the finished document may
not work out to be an accurate rendering of the testator's desires. 4 3
III. THE ONLINE, DO-IT-YOURSELF WILL-ATTESTED OR
HOLOGRAPHIC?

While the online, do-it-yourself will likely confronts significant
legal challenges, the same law of wills harbors an approach for the
post-mortem rehabilitation of at least some aspects of these wills,
especially where they run afoul of the interpretive canons long used to
apprehend testator's meaning. Such an avenue of relief is important
because it can preserve access to this area of the civil law for many
people who cannot afford a lawyer. But before we examine this avenue
of relief, we must acknowledge this more forgiving approach emanates
from the law of holographic wills-and the online, do-it-yourself will is
almost certainly not a holographic will, but is rather an attested one.
There are reasons that the do-it-yourself platforms look past the
holographic will-the age-old, quintessential do-it-yourself handwritten,
unattested instrument, the solo proposition of longstanding-to instead
facilitate the creation of an attested will, with its demanding
requirements for execution. While the holographic will may have
appeal for the person looking to go it alone in the creation of a will, the
handwritten, unattested will is not valid in all states" and, where it is
accepted, under current law, it is not without its own particular
technical requirements that go to its validity (the handwriting
requirement being one of them) .45 But perhaps more importantly, these
platforms claim to produce instruments with the integrity of
professionally prepared work (even though the websites are explicit that

assistance of counsel is not part of the package). So, consistent with the
43.
Wendy S. Goffe & Rochelle L. Haller, From Zoom to Doom? The Risks
of Do-It-Yourself Estate Planning, 38 EsT. PLAN. 27, 28 (2011).
44.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 197.
45.
JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 254 (3d ed. 2007).
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claim that the documents are on a par with professional work, these
programs produce wills that are printed and must be attested to be
validated, the type of will typically drafted by estate planning counsel.
For anyone schooled in the law of wills, however, the thought of
taking standards traditionally associated with the holographic will and
applying them to the attested variety is a radical idea. Historically, in
the law of wills, method of execution has been key. But before an
avenue of relief emanating from the law of holographic wills is rejected
out of hand, first consider that the distinction between the attested and
the holographic will is ever so slowly eroding-a point to which we will
return momentarily.4 6 But second, note that the online, do-it-yourself
will is itself a hybrid with some attributes of the attested will and others
of the holographic instrument. As such, it can be rendered subject to
the law governing the attested will for some purposes and subject to the
law governing the holographic will for others. Strictly speaking, the
online platform facilitates the creation of attested wills, wills that must
be witnessed. But like the holographic will, the online-created
instrument is usually created without assistance of legal counsel.
Therefore, where due execution is concerned, the online-created will is
appropriately governed by the law of attested wills; its postmortem
validity as a testamentary instrument is established by the fact that the
testator's signature was witnessed when it was rendered. On the other
hand, where interpretive canons long used to apprehend testator's
meaning are concerned, and where those canons recognize a principle
of interpretive largess with respect to lay-created (typically
holographic) wills, then the instrument can be appropriately subjected
to those canons, notwithstanding that it is attested.
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES-HISTORIC RIGORS Co-EXIST WITH RECENT
AMELIORATIONS

A. HistoricRigors
In this era, both the attested will and the holographic will remain
subject to demanding standards where both due execution and drafting
considerations are concerned. And this is the case despite recent efforts
to lessen the severity of certain of these standards with reference to
both types of will. If both types of will must meet demanding
requirements, however, there is no doubt that the attested variety bears
the heavier burden. But even the holographic will comes into existence
consistent with testator's intent only subject to specified standards.

46.

See infra Part IV.
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1. DUE EXECUTION-ATTESTED WILL

To the untutored eye, the classic common law requirements
governing the creation of an attested will are so arcane as to be-at
least in this era-implausible. Even a lawyer left to instincts honed in
another area of the law would likely sail past a summary statement of
those directive details required for due execution, confident that such
requirements must either be a complete misstatement of the law or be
merely advisory-something desirable in the ideal but too impractical to
be required in the ordinary course. And if a lawyer would find these
requirements farfetched, a layperson naive even to the ordinary rigors
of the law is likely to be even more befuddled when confronted with
such steps.47
A brief summary of the fundamental requirements of due execution
will go some distance in substantiating this point. As any commonplace
law school wills and trusts casebook instructs, due execution of an
attested will begins with the testator's signature.48 This requirement
should be relatively uncontroversial in the annals of the private law, as
virtually any contract or other private law document acquires legal
force by being signed by its creator or creators.49 But in addition to the
testator's signature, an attested will requires at least two people to
witness the signing."o This, too, would seem plausible enough-and
indeed easy enough to perform-until we appreciate that under the
common law a will has been "witnessed" only if the "presence
requirement" has been met: that is to say, a witnessed will requires not
only that the witnesses observe the testator sign, but also that the
testator observe the witnesses sign and, further, that the witnesses
observe each other sign. In short, the three people must act in close
proximity, both in time and space, indeed in near concert." If witnesses
sign separately or if the ritual unfolds seriatim, for example, with the
testator acting alone, in one room of a house, and the witnesses sign a
few minutes later, in other rooms, even if these other rooms adjoin the
room where the testator signed, the legal standard will have been
transgressed-and the will fails." Similar problems would result if, for
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act,
47.
88 HARV. L. REv. 489, 490 (1975).
48.
UNIF. PROB, CODE § 2-502 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). See also
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 148-50.
And that signature is advisedly placed on the will itself and not merely on
49.
the attached self-proving affidavit. See In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 613
(Tenn. 2012). But see In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1339-40 (N.J. 1991).
50.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
51.
There are two tests with respect to the presence requirement: "conscious
presence" and "line of sight." See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 159-60.
52.
In re Groffinan, [1969] 2 All ER 108 at 111-13 (Eng.).
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example, the signing were to occur around various areas of a relatively
open business floor, but where the parties could not actually see each
other signing.53
But even if a testator and witnesses manage to meet the presence
requirement, there is another doctrine-the interested witness
doctrine-that can also challenge common sense ideas about due
execution. At one time, to allow a beneficiary under the will to witness
the document could vitiate the will in its entirety, absent disinterested
witnesses of a sufficient number to satisfy the statute. In more recent
times, the common law has simply purged the interested witness of his
or her interest in excess of what this person would have taken in
intestacy. Overall and in general this makes for a less draconian
outcome in that the will stands and all transfers but the disposition to
the interested party remain intact. But if the interested party is not a
family member and thus would not take under the intestacy statute, the
interested witness still loses out entirely." And it is easy to see how the
uninitiated might run afoul of the interested witness doctrine; kith and
kin are not infrequently near to hand when it is time to execute a will
and are accordingly asked to serve as witnesses. Unfortunately, those
same people are often quite naturally beneficiaries of the will.
2. DUE EXECUTION-HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
Although the holographic will is recognized only in about half of
the states in the United States," where it is recognized, it is the
quintessential solo creation, requiring for its genesis only a would-be
testator equipped with pen and paper. Still, however, this testator must
navigate a narrow channel: witnesses are not necessary, but there are
other requirements if the law is to recognize the writing as a will. Most
importantly, not only must the instrument be signed by the testator
somewhere on the paper, but also, in the classic formalization, one
hundred percent of the document must be in the testator's
handwriting.56 These are simple enough requirements but it is still easy
to get into the weeds. Challenges have been mounted with respect to
instruments bearing a date stamp or other printed words such as the
testator's name or monogram," or indeed "Last Will and Testament."
53.
Stevens v. Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611-13 (W. Va. 1998).
54.
And what goes up can always come down. There are rules that govern
the revocation of a will and indeed the revival of a revoked will. See UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-507 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). For revival of a revoked will, see UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-509 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
55.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 197.
56.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 207-08.
57.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.2(a), illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
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Admittedly, such instruments have often survived, especially when the
handwritten portions of the document are deemed sufficient unto
themselves.5 But the fact that such challenges are mounted is evidence
that a spirit of formalism still informs the law governing even the
holographic will.
B. Reform-Proving the Writing as a Will
If both the attested will and the holographic will have long been
subject to exacting standards where execution is concerned, for both
types of will the rigors are gradually abating. This attenuation of
standards should facilitate lay-endeavors with respect to estate planning
in general and the lay-produced, online-created instrument in particular.
Interestingly, however, as the relevant law abates its rigors, the two
types of wills start to converge, at least where the fundamental aspects
of execution are concerned. As this happens, it becomes easier and
more justifiable to recognize the online, do-it-yourself will as a hybrid
and then to subject this hybrid to standards of interpretation previously
applied to holographic wills, even though the online will is not typically
conceived as a handwritten instrument.
1. ATTESTED WILL

-

Over the last several decades, the Restatement and the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) have made efforts to bring the law of wills into
the modern era, making it more accessible for general practitioners as
well as the public. Under the UPC, gone is the presence requirement as
well as the interested witness doctrine, making due execution of an
attested will far less of a trap for the uninitiated.60 Further, two
additional doctrines-Substantial Compliance 6 ' and Harmless Error 6 2
have gained a degree of currency in some states, empowering courts to
grant relief where some enduring requirement of due execution has
See id. § 3.2(a), illus. 3.
58.
Courts have been known to ignore the typewritten words or phrases either
59.
on an "intent" theory or a "surplusage" theory, the rationale being that the handwritten
portions of the instrument are sufficient unto themselves. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1999). But
see In re Estate of Thorn, 192 P. 19, 22 (Cal. 1920) (holographic will is invalid when
the name of home is stamped in two places on document). See also Jeffrey J. Lux,
Determining Testamentary Intent in a Holographic Will by Referencing Typewritten
Language? Not in Nebraska: An Analysis of the Nebraska Supreme Court's Ruling in
Estate of Foxley v. Hogan, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 199, 228-32 (1999).
For the elimination of the presence requirement, see UNIF. PROB. CODE
60.
2-505(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).

61.
62.

See generally Langbein, supra note 47.
See UNIF PROB. CODE § 2-503 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
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gone awry. For example, where the testator or the witnesses fail to
execute the will but sign the self-proving affidavit (a separate document
attached to the will that aims to simplify probate by letting the
witnesses "pre-testify" that the testator properly executed the will). 63
While these reforms have hardly been adopted in all jurisdictions,'
there is a discernable trend. The strict formalism of the attestation ritual
appears to be attenuating. To create an attested will, under the amended
requirements, there is no more a requirement of all hands on deck;
witnesses can sign later and, under some new statutes, they can sign not
just later but also separately. 65 In short, as the doctrine of Substantial
Compliance suggests, while some percentage of the classic elements of
due execution are required with respect to any attested will and no one
supposes that some requirements are not more essential than others,
these amendments do suggest that an "attested" will can be valid even
without the two witnesses present together with the testator. Indeed,
under certain reformed statutes, a will can now be valid with only one
witness."
2. HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

Just as the legal rigor attendant upon the execution of an attested
instrument has abated somewhat in the last several decades, so have the
requirements for a holographic will become less rigid. The cases that
have moved the law here arise from courts' seeking to probate misexecuted stationary store form wills as holographic wills. The preprinted form available traditionally at a stationery shop (or in recent
times more likely as part of a kit purchased at a bookstore)
contemplates attestation, the only available method of execution, given
that a holographic will had to be entirely in the testator's handwriting
and the stationery form includes pre-printed text. As we can anticipate
with the online, lay-created will, laymen trying to use the stationery
form have been known to afoul of the requirements for witnessing a
will. When this has happened, beneficiaries have asked the court to
admit the writing to probate as a holographic will." When courts began
to grant relief, they did so at first only where enough of the document
was in the testator's writing that the disposition (including words of

63.
See In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991).
64.
In re Estate of Chastain, 401 S.W.3d 612, 622 (Tenn. 2012).
65.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
66.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
Note that the solitary witness was a notary public or "other individual authorized by
law to take acknowledgements." Id. See also James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism,
55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1026-27 (1992).
67
In re Estate of Thorn, 192 P. 19 (Cal. 1920).
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transfer) could be apprehended without recourse to the printed text.68
Eventually, however, at least some courts have admitted instruments
where the printed text was necessary to make sense of the handwritten
language as a will. 69

C. An Intersection on the Horizon
To date, liberalized standards for proving a will, whether the
instrument be attested or holographic, prevail only in a minority of
jurisdictions and there they are used to grant relief only on a few fact
patterns.70 In this era, in a majority of jurisdictions the law with respect
to proving a will remains unforgiving. Nevertheless, to the extent
various changes constitute a trend away from formalism and rigidity,
they bode well not only for lay-endeavors in estate planning (including
the online, do-it-yourself will), but also for much of the estate planning
work product of the practicing generalist. If this trend comes to
fruition, then in time to come, the attorney or would-be testator who
ignores some particular nicety otherwise essential to proving a will can
reasonably anticipate the operative jurisdiction will find legal
justification to admit the instrument to probate nevertheless.
But something else appears to be happening in this surrender of
formalism and rigidity: the stark contrast between the witnessed will
and the holographic one is abating. The two avenues to testation under
the common law are becoming more alike. Indeed it could be said they
are collapsing into each other. Today the attested will still has its
genesis in a concerted exercise involving testator and witnesses, the
witnesses on board to authenticate the testator's act. At the other end of
the spectrum, the holographic will comes into being in a solo
enterprise, the law relying on the testator's handwriting to authenticate
his expression. As the future unfolds, however, and at one end of the
spectrum over-looked or misapplied elements of attestation are
commonly forgiven and at the other end the "holographic" will
encompasses increasing amounts of printed text, it is easy to foresee a
day when a printed text signed by a testator acting without witnesses
will suffice to create a will.

68.
Estate of Carson, 344 P.2d 612 (Cal. 1959).
69.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). See also
Bruce L. Stout, Handwritten Wills May Be Valid If CertainRequirements Are Met, 30
EST. PLAN. 174, 178 (2003).
70.
The doctrine of Substantial Compliance has been confined by a number of
courts to grant relief only under a few fact patterns. See Snide v. Johnson, 418 N.E.2d
656, 658 (N.Y. 1981) (a "switched wills" case where the court grants relief on what it
describes as "narrow facts"). See also In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1334 (N.J.
1991). But see In re Will of Ferree, 848 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2003).

968

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

But this state of affairs is yet to be realized. At this stage of
maturity, what is perhaps most important is the larger normative
significance of the trend. Most importantly, the developments which are
drawing the two types of wills together make it easier and less heretical
to appropriate a standard generally associated with one type of will and
apply it to the other, at least where a there is a principled basis for
doing so. In short, in this era we are freer to take standards
traditionally associated with the holographic will and apply them to the
attested will, and vice versa.
Such innovative avenues of relief are important if the online, do-ityourself will is going to make possible the voluntary disposition of
property at death by an otherwise underserved constituency. And this
innovation with respect to relief is relevant not just where the rigors of
due execution are concerned but, perhaps more importantly, they also
come into play with respect to dispositive language of the testamentary
instrument. While standards for proving a will have begun to lessen
their severity, authenticating the will is not the only challenge
confronted by beneficiaries of a lay-drafted instrument. Once the will
has been admitted to probate, the language of disposition comes to the
fore. And testators operating alone commonly make drafting errors:
they misuse legal terms," they make mistakes in naming beneficiaries, 72
and they fail to address a multitude of default provisions embedded in
the common law (and varying state by state) which can disrupt a plan of
disposition substantially.
Unfortunately, little amelioration has
occurred with respect to the canons of interpretation-as they are
applied to wills-with one exception. Where the will has been produced
without assistance of legal counsel, judges have been known to show
the instrument a degree of interpretive generosity otherwise
unavailable.74
The online, do-it-yourself will has yet to benefit from this
exception, however, and indeed by some lights should not qualify. The
will that has characteristically been shown this relief has been the
holographic will, the testator's solo act created not just without

71.
See Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 355-56 (Cal. 1968) (construing
residuary bequest of valuable real estate to "Chester Quinn and Roxy Russell," Roxy
Russell being a dog, as an attempt to transfer property to a dog, with the transfer thus
failing so that it lapsed and passed by intestacy).
72.
Moseley v. Goodman, 195 S.W. 590, 590-91 (Tenn. 1917).
73.
Consider, for example, the most recent version of the Anti-Lapse Statute,
governing the disposition of property when a beneficiary predeceases a testator. See
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). For the controversy
surrounding it, see Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and
Better, or More like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 654-55
(1993).
74.
Henry Griffith, 7 So. 2d 560 (Ala. 1942).
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witnesses, but most importantly without legal counsel. The online, doit-yourself will is meant to be an attested instrument. But further,
beyond the will being attested, the commercial platforms themselves
would seemingly disqualify any will generated there as the platforms
purport to produce a document with the integrity of professionally
prepared work.
Here is where the erosion of the two types of wills realizes its
ultimate normative import. The seemingly disappearing distinction
between the attested will and holographic will invites a broader
application of this interpretive largess. The legal magnanimity that
heretofore has been used to salvage the holographic will can now be
used to reform misused provisions appearing in the online, do-ityourself will, notwithstanding that the latter is advertised as tantamount
to an attested instrument. What matters is not whether the online, do-ityourself will is attested. What matters is that it is prepared without
assistance of legal counsel. In this way, it bears a significant feature in
common with the holographic will and should get the benefit of the
relief often shown the handwritten, unwitnessed will.
V. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

The rigid and esoteric requirements for proving a will are ripe for
reform and, as we have seen, indeed that reform is underway. But even
if the rigors of due execution are ameliorating, the canons of
interpretation remain a significant challenge to laypeople and the
general practitioner. The persistent challenge in the creation of a will
resides in the disconnect between the canons of construction applicable
to testamentary language and meanings (drawn from ordinary language)
that the uninitiated can try to use in making a will pro se. In short, if a
testator's desires are to be realized absent the guidance of skilled
counsel, it is not simply a matter of meeting the requirements for
proving a will. Once the will has been admitted to probate, the
language of the instrument itself is subject to judicial interpretation and
construction consistent with long-standing canons. And given these
canons, there are a myriad ways for the language of a will to miscarry.
A. Longstanding Rules
These historic canons are particularly rigid where, knowingly or
not, terms of art are employed, as terms of art here will be construed
pursuant to the stipulative definitions operative in the law of wills. A
bequest to my "heirs" disposes of property to the testator's heirs
pursuant to the relevant intestacy statute, notwithstanding there are
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other persons that the testator had in mind as recipient of his or her
benefaction."
But language can miscarry in other ways also. For example,
language of disposition is necessary to effectuate a transfer of
property-a point that would seemingly give rise to little controversy.
But under the law of wills, the language of effective disposition is
hardly intuitive. While nowadays it would be unlikely for a court to
deem a "bequest" of real property unintelligible, real property being
appropriately "devised" while only personal property is "bequeathed,"
the legal discipline that distinguishes between real and personal
property remains sufficiently robust that casebooks still note the
distinction.7 6 Further, proscriptions with respect to language that is
merely precatory provide another challenge. In a will, the seemingly
deferential and indeed tactful "I would like" is generally deemed
equivocal and thus ineffectual to transfer an interest, whereas the
directive "I bequeath" succeeds as manifesting a requisite certainty."
But further again, beneficiary names lend themselves to confusion and
even mistake." And beneficiaries can predecease a testator creating a
lapse and triggering gap-filling mechanisms in the law that, absent
knowledgeable drafting, may not align with the testator's wishes. 79
Finally, property devised or bequeathed when the will is signed can be
sold and not replaced, leaving the would-be beneficiary with nothing,
which may or may not be consistent with what the testator actually
wanted."8

75.
See Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1933) (construing
bequests to "heirs at law" as a transfer to decedent's cousins-her heirs at law under
state law-rather than to her aunt, her intended beneficiary per her attorney's notes).
76.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 22, at 43-44. See also VALERIE
VOLLMER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1177 (2003).Recently,

some draftspersons have side-stepped the niceties of "devise" and "bequeath," using
the word "give" to effectuate a transfer, whatever the type of property. But still others
point out that the term "give" has drawbacks as it bespeaks an act prior to death, not a
testamentary act. And to construe a transfer as a gift could be advantageous to the
recipient as property transferred prior to death often avoids shouldering a share of
testator's debts-something a testamentary transfer is unlikely to do. See Gruen v.
Gruen, which states that "[tihere is an important distinction between the intent with
which an inter vivos gift is made and the intent to make a gift by will." 469 N.E.2d
869, 872 (N.Y. 1986). The former makes an irrevocable present transfer while the
latter makes a disposition only effective after death. For liability for creditor's claims,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
77.
See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the
Law of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13-14 (2007).
78.
See In re Estate of Gibbs, 111 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. 1961).
79.
See Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
80.
See In re Estate of Anton, 731 N.W.2d 19 (Iowa 2007).
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This rigid approach to the language of the will is crystallized in the
deep resistance to the post mortem correction of mistakes and receives
its ultimate expression in the "Plain Meaning" or "No Further
Evidence" doctrine." This rule prohibits a court from taking evidence
as to the testator's meaning apart from its manifestation in the language
of the will. The will alone speaks from the grave, so other evidence of
the testator's plans or desires is inadmissible for purposes of
interpreting the will.82 Admittedly, over time, a number of de minimis
exceptions to this rule have emerged." But while auguring relief where
some instruments are concerned, this short list of idiosyncratic
holdings84 has only made the law of wills more complex and, if
possible, less accessible, both to the layperson as well as the practicing
generalist.
In summary, at no point do courts allow that anything other than
donor intent is relevant in interpreting the language of a will.
Traditionally under the common law courts refuse to conjecture what a
testator might have intended, but appropriately take a will on its face.
When terms of art are used, they apply their stipulative meanings.
When conventional terms or ordinary language appears, it is read
consistently with dictionary meanings. "The will must be construed in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with what the
testatrix intended or would have wished to say."8 In summary, "with
unexpressed intent the courts are not concerned." 86 And both lacunae in
the will-property overlooked or standard provisions (like a residuary
clause) omitted-as well as idiosyncratic applications of terms of art are
instances of unexpressed intent which the traditional common law court
will not rectify.

81.
See Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Mass. 2000);
Mahoney v. Grainger, 186 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1933).
82.
The case law is unequivocal: The traditional common law court refuses to
conjecture as to what a testator might have intended. The will must be construed in
accordance with what it says and not in accordance with what the testatrix intended or
would have wished to say. See Wolfe v. Hatheway, 70 A. 645, 647 (Conn. 1908);
Comstock v. Comstock, 63 A. 449, 451 (Conn. 1906).
See In re Estate of Cole, 621 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. Minn. 2001)
83.
(illustrating the exception for latent ambiguities); Moseley v. Goodman, 195 S.W. 590
(Tenn. 1917) (illustrating the personal use exception); Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d
914 (N.J. 1956) (illustrating falsa domonstratio non nocet).
To list a few: latent (as opposed to patent) ambiguity; "personal usage
84.
exception," "falsa demonstratio nun nocet," "detail of identification," etc. For a
discussion of the latent ambiguity and "falso demonstrario nun nocet" exceptions, see
Perkins v. O'Donald, 82 So. 401, 405 (Fla. 1919). For a discussion of the personal
usage execution, see Ayres v. Weed, 16 Conn. 291, 300-01 (1844).
85.
Birge v. Nucomb, 105 A. 335, 336 (Conn. 1918).
86.
See id. at 336. See also Wolfe, 70 A. at 647; Comstock, 63 A. at 451.
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B. CorrectingMistakes?
The good news is that the No Evidence Rule is starting to yield,
with the Restatemente 7 and the Uniform Probate Code" again leading
the way, by empowering courts to correct mistakes in drafting. The bad
news is that, in the face of an error, the new standard requires clear and
convincing evidence of the testator's actual intention and, further,
similar evidence that the language of the will was the product of
mistake of law or fact, either in expression or inducement. What would
rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence? In the few cases
where mistakes as such have been corrected, the evidence of testator's
actual intent has been substantiated with the attorney's notes or with the
terms of an earlier will. The earlier will would have been attorneydrafted, similar to the instrument in question and the will the instrument
in question would otherwise supersede. To date, applications of the
doctrine would suggest that it is better calculated to correct errors made
by an attorney rather than a testator acting alone. This is welcome news
to the generalist who finds himself in over his head in the law of wills.
But otherwise, the need to produce clear and convincing evidence is
likely to frustrate the granting of relief where no lawyer has been
involved.
VI. INTERPRETIVE LARGESS-EXTENDING THE DOCTRINE

If the newly-cast doctrine of mistake seems poorly calculated to
address drafting errors made by a lay-person, there is buried in the law
another avenue of relief, a doctrine of interpretive generosity that,
interestingly, is directed specifically at the lay-drafted instrument. Not
every court is inclined to interpretive generosity, however, whatever
the genesis of the instrument. But others take the position that, "when
the instrument on its face shows that it was written by an inexperienced
or illiterate person, it should be construed more liberally than if it had
been drawn by an expert." 89 The instrument that has commonly
benefited from this generosity has been the holographic will, the
characteristic product of self-help. But there is no reason why other laydrafted testamentary instruments should not merit the same legal
largess, including those that are attested-such as the online, do-it-

yourself will.
Within the doctrinal rubric of interpretive generosity, the analysis
begins like any construction proceeding, by paying homage to the

87.
TRANSFERS

88.
89.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)
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PROP.:

WILLS
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OTHER

§ 12.1 (AM.

LAW INST. 1999).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-805 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).

In re Estate ofLampkin, 21 Cal. Rptr. 513, 514 (1962).

DONATIVE
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lodestar of donor intent." With any will, the inquiry into intent is
appropriately centered on the language the testator used. Where the
instrument is lay-drawn and the doctrine of interpretive generosity is
employed, however, the inquiry is appropriately (as one court has put
it) open-textured. 91 "The rule for the ascertaining of testator's intention
or the means and method by which it is obtained are variable and
depend upon no absolute and fixed standard.

. . . "92

Only where language in a will has a "fixed and universal meaning,
and [is] of such common understanding as to exclude the hypothesis
that another and distinct meaning was intended," does interpretive
generosity require such language to stand on its own.93 When meaning
ceases to be obvious, however, the ultimate goal becomes to arrive at
what was apparently or presumably in the testator's mind at the time of
making his will.
All other considerations are subordinate to that and to effect
it; punctuation, spelling, construction, the rules of grammar,
the literary meaning of words, verbal niceties, may all be
disregarded, while on the other hand consideration may be
given to the effect of common usage on language, and to the
testator's
mental
capacity,
education,
habits,
and
94
environment.
A court can inquire into the context of the will (including the
circumstances surrounding the testator at the time the will was made),
the value and extent of the testator's property, any particular purpose
for a given transfer, the relationship between the testator and any
beneficiary, and any other consideration likely to lend insight into
testator's true intent. 95 As for terms of art, where they appear in a laydrafted instrument, recognition of stipulative meanings (as understood
by well-schooled practitioners) is only the first layer of inquiry.96
Where the will is lay-drafted, any inquiry into the meaning of terms of
art must allow for idiosyncratic usage.

90.
Perry v. Bulkley, 72 A. 1014, 1017 (Conn. 1909).
91.
Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 158 A. 224, 226 (Conn.
1932); Wolfe, 70 A. at 647.
92.
Blessing v. Johnson, 61 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933).
93.
Id.
94.
Buchwald v. Buchwald, 199 A. 795, 798 (Md. 1938).
95.
See In re Estate of Northcutt, 107 P.2d 607, 610-11 (Cal. 1940). As
declared by CAL. PROB. CODE § 21122 (West 2015-16), technical words in a will are to
be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the
testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense.
96.
In re Estate of Northcutt, 107 P.2d at 610-11.
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Extending the doctrine of interpretive largesse beyond the
traditional and fairly uncommon holographic will to all lay-drafted
wills, including the online, do-it-yourself will, augurs a significant
impact on the larger law of wills-a point to which we will return
momentarily. But for people of modest or moderate means, who are
constrained to embark upon a journey into the law of wills without
assistance of expert counsel, this doctrine makes the right of disposition
at death not just accessible but-perhaps more importantlymeaningful, in that the disposition effected by the law is more likely to
approximate the testator's intent. This is the case especially if the court
can approach the lay-drafted instrument-language included and
language omitted-with common sense, ready to locate the will in the
totality of relevant facts and circumstances. Admittedly, this "opentextured" approach is unavoidably ad hoc and the outcome difficult to
predict, at least as a matter of law. But where the underrepresented are
concerned, to take the alternative route and impose the canonical rigors
of will construction on lay-drafted instruments risks results that are
downright perverse. A recent Florida case provides a powerful
illustration of this point.
Aldrich v. Basile concerned a will produced pro se and executed in
2004.97 The testator did not turn to an online, do-it-yourself instrument
but rather used a stationary form.98 Guided by the form, the testator set
forth a number of assets, including a house, its contents, a Fidelity
rollover IRA, a United Defense Life Insurance policy, an automobile,
and all her bank accounts at M&S Bank-virtually everything of value
she owned at the time. 99 She bequeathed these items to her sister, but
directed that if her sister did not survive her, the items were to go
instead to her brother.oo The will contained no other dispositive
provisions. o'
Three years later, the sister died and, as it worked out, left cash
and land to the testator.102 The sister who was to be the testator's
beneficiary instead became her benefactor.103
In 2009, the testator herself passed away.104 With the testator's
sister dead, the brother then, as per the terms of the will, became the
substitute beneficiary.10 ' But the question was whether the assets

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

136 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 532.
Id.
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inherited from her sister-which were not mentioned in her willpassed pursuant to it to her brother, or whether they passed free of the
will to her intestate heirs. 10 6
Unfortunately, the stationary form lacked a residuary clause-a
provision that follows upon the listing of specifically bequeathed or
devised property and disposes of anything remaining, the "rest, residue
and remainder" of the testator's estate."o' Absent such a provision, the
will that the testator assembled did not dispose of the property received
from her sister, at least not per the letter of the law.os
The court took a hard line and offered a classic analysis consistent
with the four corners doctrine.109 Even though her brother was the sole
surviving devisee under the will, without a residuary clause or general
devise, only the property specifically referenced in the will passed to
him."o As the Florida court explained, "[a]ny other interpretation of
the testator's actions would require this Court to rewrite the will to
include provisions regarding property for which the testator made
none." 1 The court refused "to speculate that the testator intended for
her sole devisee to have more than she specifically listed in her will,
despite language in the will indicating the opposite." 112 Even though her
brother was (after her sister died) the sole beneficiary under the will,
without a residuary clause or some such language of general
disposition, only the property specifically referenced in the will passed
to the brother.11 3 The assets inherited by the testator from her sister
passed to her intestate heirs.' 14
The court took this position in the face of a 2008 writing in which
the testator appeared to attempt a codicil to her will."' The paper
(which was found with the will) read "This is an addendum to my will
dated April 5, 2004. Since my sister . . . passed away, I reiterate that
all my worldly possessions pass to my brother . . . ."116 Because the
paper was not signed, however, it could not be probated as a
holographic codicil."' Neither did the court treat this writing as

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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Id.
Id.
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evidence of intent under the 2004 instrument and use it to glean any
insight into the disposition there."1
The concurrence in Aldrich describes the case as a cautionary tale,
a classic admonishment with respect to the pitfalls of testamentary selfhelp. 1 9 Had the Florida court granted this will a special status as a laydrafted instrument, however, then an open-textured approach consistent
with interpretive generosity would have allowed the court to construe
the will together with the attempted codicil to conclude that this testator
wanted all of her property, including that inherited from her sister, to
go to her brother. Even though the codicil was not executed and thus
was not effective to transfer property at death, as a writing it
nevertheless bore an evidentiary salience, especially given that, at the
time she made the will, if her sister did not survive her, the testator
wanted her brother to have everything of value she had then. The
attempted codicil supports the contention that at the testator's death, she
continued in the desire that her brother receive everything she had.
VII. INTERPRETIVE LARGESS AND THE ESTATE PLANNING BARRESERVATIONS

There is no doubt that, when courts employ interpretive largess,
they effectively suspend the no further inquiry rule. Where a will is
subjected to this more generous standard, it is not just the will alonethe "plain meaning" of what can be gleaned from the "four corners" of
the instrument-that speaks from the grave, but other materials serving
various and sundry purposes during the testator's life can come in as
aids to lend meaning to testamentary language used or indeed omitted.
And this openness occurs without a requirement that evidence
introduced be clear and convincing or indeed without imposing any
evidentiary standard whatsoever. If the question is whether interpretive
generosity entails any alternative legal methodology-some sort of
alternative discipline to be employed in construing the lay-drafted
will-the answer is no, at least none to date. 1 20
Interpretive largess thus invites courts to set aside long held
precedents that make for predictable legal outcomes in favor of a
smorgasbord of ad hoc approaches to discerning donor intent. As a
radical departure from a highly developed legal regime, interpretive

118.
Id. at 536.
119.
Id. at 538 (Pariente, J., concurring).
120.
"[W]here a will is drawn by one learned in the law and skilled in the use
of its terminology the words employed will ordinarily be given their accustomed
technical meaning, but where it is drawn by a layman the language used may be given
the meaning it would commonly have to a person in his situation." Buchwald v.
Buchwald, 199 A. 795, 798 (Md. 1938).
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largess is certain to be controversial. And application of this approach
to donor intent beyond the holographic instrument to any and all wills
spawned in self-help is likely to be met with resistance, especially in
the estate planning bar. In Aldrich, the Real Property Probate and Trust
Section of the Florida Bar, in an amicus brief, took the same tough line
as the Court-that absent a general bequest in the will, there was no
indication of testamentary intent with respect to the after-acquired
property.12 1 Per the Florida Bar, property inherited from the sister
appropriately passed by intestacy. The genesis of the will in untutored
self-help was accorded no legal import.' 22
The position of the Florida bar would appear to bespeak the claim
of many in the larger access-to-justice movement-that a fundamental
impediment to expanding access to civil law institutions is the bar
itself.1 23 The bar has a particular reason to see that the law and
procedures remain resistant to litigation pro se.124 It is not (so the
argument goes) that members of the bar count on or covet the modest
fees attendant upon representing the poor or even the middle class.
What is really at stake (the argument continues) are the fees flowing
from the more prosperous clients.125 The claim is that if representation
pro se became accessible and effective, wealthier clients might also
avail themselves of it in simpler matters and the low-hanging fruit of
legal practice would vanish.1 26
Any discomfort in the estate planning bar with respect to
interpretive largess might be seen as of a piece with this general
resistance to expanded opportunities for representation pro se. But
whatever the reasons for which the larger bar might resist expansion of
representation pro se, it is doubtful that members of the estate planning
bar in particular fear that wealthier clients will in significant numbers
be inclined to secure their estates to their progeny via LegalZoom or
other stratagems of legal self-help. This is because, when employed
correctly, the law of future interests can achieve extraordinary tax
savings for very wealthy families, especially if the law is used to
exploit far into the future certain taxpayer-friendly provisions of the
federal estate and gift tax. Indeed, in addition, these same structures
often provide asset protection for these families. But key to these
advantages are multi-layered plans realized by means of sophisticated

121.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section
of the Florida Bar (supporting the decision under review) at 6-8, Aldrich, 136 So. 3d
530 (Fla. 2014).
122.
See Aldrich, 136 So. 3d at 533.
123.
Barton, supra note 6, at 1268.
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
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and highly complex provisions in wills and other estate planning
documents. And given the extended time horizon that is integral to such
planning, structures are inevitably bespoke, drafted mindfully, in ways
that are likely to work for a given family over multiple generations.
Needless to say, creation of such long-term strategies entails not only
considerable technical expertise, but also extensive attorney-client
consultation.
Thus, whatever the resistance of the larger bar to the expansion of
opportunities for litigation pro se, there is another (and better) reason
for the estate planning bar to resist the expansion of interpretive
largess, at least in its present form.127 These practitioners have no
interest in seeing the law of future interests erode, disintegrating
through the application of interpretive largess into a collection of ad hoc
holdings. The law of future interests is not only their stock-in-trade. To
the extent that their more affluent clients come to them seeking the full
realization of their soon-to-be dead hands (often in complex strategies
that operate across multiple generations of a family), these attorneys
utilize the law of future interests-a language that renders the right to
transfer property at death in myriad shapes and forms. Moreover, these
attorneys need courts that understand and embrace this language
standing at the ready, prepared to enforce the rights and obligations
expressed in the present but meant to operate in the future-indeed
possibly in perpetuity.
Therefore, for those who appreciate that the law of future interests
can make for the realization of testamentary freedom on an
extraordinary scale, there are good reasons to resist the expanded
application of an ad hoc approach to testamentary intent such as
interpretive largess. At the same time, however, the needs of people of
modest means endure. The access-to-justice movement is correct: the
law as it stands does not serve them. Currently, a law that in its
complexity and rigor brilliantly facilitates the needs of the very affluent
effectively places the right of testation beyond the reach of people of
more moderate means.
If the misgivings of the estate planning bar have merit, the way
forward is to ignore these misgivings, at least initially, and extend

127.
However, much of the law of wills has in recent decades been subjected
to the liberalizing efforts of the authors of the Restatement and the UPC, note that, to
date, this has had only a modest impact on what the estate planning bar thinks is
necessary to draft and execute a will properly. And their conservatism is not
unjustified. Because testators tend to be peripatetic, at least while living, no one can be
certain where a person may be domiciled at death-and what law a particular court
might apply to determine the validity and meaning of the will. This uncertainty means
that, so long as the rigid and unforgiving elements of the common law are still in place
in any state (as they remain to date), then the estate planning bar continues to prepare
for the rigors of the old school.
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interpretive largess beyond the holographic will so that it is applicable
to any lay-created testamentary instrument. That being said, if
interpretive largess is to be extended in some ways, it must be
circumscribed in others. As an approach to uncovering donor intent, the
application of interpretive largess must be limited so that the law of
future interests is left intact even as the right of testation is made
meaningful to the less affluent.
A comprehensive exploration of the possible ways to circumscribe
interpretive largess so that it does not jeopardize the law of future
interests is beyond the scope of this Article. However, an obvious
constraint would restrict the approach to probate estates of a certain
size and smaller, precluding the use of the approach in the construction
of wills transferring property valued in excess of some statutory
amount, perhaps $250,000 (to be adjusted over time). Limiting
application of the approach in this way could also restrict the force of
any precedent that emerges applicable only to estates falling under the
statutory amount. On the other hand, wills transferring property valued
in excess of $250,000 would be subject to the full rigor of the law,
whether or not the instrument was the product of self-help. For the
testator who dies with a probate estate in excess of the stipulated sum,
this person would take the voyage without assistance of counsel at his
or her own risk.
Once interpretive largess is restricted to probate estates of modest
size, then this approach to the construction of wills can develop into a
mature legal doctrine. Commentators and courts can develop an
alternative legal methodology-including evidentiary standardsappropriate to the construction of lay-drafted wills. Short of the
realization of a mature methodology (or perhaps alongside it), the law
could simply embed in interpretive largess certain legal preferences
with respect to the construction of ambiguous language-e.g., a
preference in favor of present interests and against future interests; and
perhaps a presumption against inter vivos gifts and in favor of
testamentary transfers.128 In all events, such preferences should be
developed with an eye to the time horizons appropriate to smaller sums
of money.

128.
For a lay-drafted instrument that is ambiguous as to whether the language
is means to affect an immediate transfer (a gift) or a testamentary one, see In re Estate
of Sargavak, 216 P.2d 850, 851-52 (Cal. 1950); In re Estate of Golder, 193 P.2d 465,
466-67 (Cal. 1948); In re Estate of Spitzer, 237 P. 739, 741-42 (Cal. 1925); In re
Estate of Taylor, 259 P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); 1 PAGE ON THE LAW
OF WILLS § 5.14, at 204; W. E. Shipley, Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence Upon Issue
of Testamentary Intent, 21 A.L.R.2d 319, 324, 326 (1952).
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